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A B S T R A C T
In recent years m any studies have been conducted w orldw ide in order to  investigate the structural or long­
term  determ inants o f  tax  revenue (see in ter alia Gupta, 2007; M ahdavi, 2007; P rofeta and Scabrosetti, 2010). 
The aim  o f  this study is to  extend the em pirical literature on this issue by applying standard m odels to  the 
case o f  Latin A m erica and the Caribbean. Through panel econom etric m ethodologies, the paper assesses the 
statistical significance o f  a  num ber o f  potential determ inants o f  tax  revenue as a  share o f  G D P, using data 
from  32 Latin A m erican countries over the period 1990-2009. The em pirical analysis pays particular 
attention to  exam ine the relevance o f  political and historical variables to  understand regional differences in 
tax  revenue. The results indicate that, am ong the variables tha t exert a  statistically significant influence on 
tax  revenue are the follow ing ones: civil liberties, fem ale labor force participation, the age com position o f  
the population, the degree o f  political stability, the level o f  education, the population density as w ell as the 
size o f  the shadow  econom y.
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The level o f  tax a tio n  in  L atin  A m erica , in  pa rticu la r in  C entral A m erica , is very  low  com pared  w ith  
o th e r reg ions in  the  w orld . T his is w orry in g  g iven  th a t an  in su ffic ien t level o f  fiscal revenue m akes it 
ex trem ely  d ifficu lt fo r any gov ern m en t to  adequate ly  prov ide pub lic  serv ices and  to  m eet the basic  
needs o f  the  popu la tio n  in  term s o f  health , education  and security , no t to  m en tion  to  p u t in  p lace a 
deve lopm en t ag en d a  to  carry  ou t a  structu ral transfo rm atio n  o f  the  econom y to  b o o st grow th . Low  
fiscal revenues are in  m an y  coun tries a  m ain  cause o f  p o o r p ub lic  serv ices and  in frastructu re  as w ell an 
im portan t constra in t on social expenditure .
T he aim  o f  th is  p ap er is to  iden tify  the  m ain  lo n g -ru n  determ inan ts o f  ta x  revenue, bo th  its 
m a jo r item s as w ell as its aggregate  to ta l. To do so, the em pirical analysis considers th ree  g roups o f  
exogenous variab les: econom ic, p o litica l and  socio -dem ograph ic  ones. The em pirica l analysis is based  
on the app lica tion  o f  panel regressions m odels. The underly ing  assum ption  is th a t by  know ing  the long- 
run  de term inan ts o f  ta x  revenues, po licy  m akers in  the  reg ion  m ay  be b e tte r equ ipped  to  iden tify  som e 
o f  the  obstac les th a t fiscal reform s face and, there fo re , to  iden tify  p o licy  instrum ents th a t m ay  help  to  
rem ove them .
The pap er is organized as follow s. A fte r th is  in troduction , chapter I p resen ts a  b r ie f  review  o f  
recent studies on the structural determ inants o f  tax  revenues in  developing countries. C hapter II show s the 
sty lized  facts o f  tax  revenues in  the sam ples selected, and chap ter III in troduces, both , the  econom etric 
specification th a t is used fo r the  em pirical analysis and the list o f  exogenous variab les typ ically  
considered  in  the relevant literature on th is issue. The results o f  the econom etric analysis are d iscussed  in 
chapter IV. F inally , chap ter V  puts forw ard the conclusions and  points to  fu rther research  on this 




I. R E C E N T  S E L E C T E D  S T U D IE S  O F  T H E  S T R U C T U R E  O F  T A X A T IO N  O N
D E V E L O P IN G  C O U N T R IE S
In the last five to  ten  years there have been a  considerable num ber o f  studies devoted to  identify the 
historical determ inants factors behind the regional and national differences in  taxation structure. Their 
conclusions are rather diverse, in part due to  the heterogeneity  in m ethodologies, the set o f  countries 
covered, the specific variables and the periods considered for the em pirical analysis.
A ccording to  a  study o f  A bhijit Sen G upta  (2007), th a t covers 105 developing countries over 25 
years, the fo llow ing variables have a  positive and statistically  sign ifican t association  w ith  tax  revenue per 
cap ita : size o f  the econom y as reflected  by  G D P a t purchasing  pow er parity , trade openness, fo reign  aid, 
and a  num ber o f  indicators o f  po litical and econom ic stability. O n the o ther hand, the study concludes tha t 
the share o f  agriculture in  G D P, and  an  ind icato r o f  corruption  exert a  statistically  significant negative 
influence on the level o f  tax  revenues. D ividing his sam ple in  three groups according to  the level o f  
incom e, the study finds th a t foreign aid has a  sign ifican t and  positive effect on tax  revenues in  low  
incom e countries bu t no t in m iddle o r h igh incom e ones. M oreover, he finds a  strong, negative 
relationship  betw een  tax  revenue and corruption  only fo r the m iddle and low  incom e countries. Political 
stability  is negatively  associated  w ith  tax  revenue only in  h igh  incom e countries; in  the others the 
association  is positive. F inally , he identifies a  negative re lation  betw een  ind irect taxes and revenue 
perform ance, in the sense th a t overall ta x  revenue as a  share o f  G D P tends to  be low er in  the presence o f  a 
relatively  h igh level o f  taxes on goods and services.
B ird, M artinez-V elasquez and  T org ler (2004) analyze data  on tax  revenues and th e ir  determ inants 
in  a  sam ple o f  110 developing countries fo r 1990-1999. A m ong th e ir m ain  conclusions stand ou t the 
fo llow ing ones: i) p er cap ita  G D P is positively  associated  w ith  tax  revenue, bu t trade openness does no t 
have a  statistically  sign ifican t influence, and ii) dem ographic g row th  and the share o f  agriculture in  G D P 
are associated  w ith  low er levels o f  tax  revenue. T heir results also suggest th a t the degree o f  inequality , the 
size o f  the  shadow  econom y and  the regulation o f  en try  are negatively  associated  w ith  tax  revenue. The 
indices o f  civil liberties and political rights, political stability , rule o f  law  and  relative absence o f  
corruption have a  statically  sign ifican t positive association w ith  tax  revenue. One o f  th e ir  conclusions is 
th a t b e tte r and m ore effic ien t institu tions lead  to  a  h igher level o f  tax  revenue. H ow ever, one could  also 
argue the causality  in  the opposite d irection , i.e. h igher levels o f  taxation  m ake it possib le to  have 
e ffic ien t institutions. F inally , th e ir  study does som e regional com parisons and finds th a t the  low er level o f  
tax  revenue in L atin  A m erica relative to  o ther developing countries is m ain ly  due to  the low er quality  o f  
its institu tions, h igher corruption, la rger shadow  econom y and  low er ta x  rates.
M ahdavi (2007), in his analysis o f  data  o f  43 developing countries over the period  1973-2002, 
finds a  positive correlation  betw een  tax  revenue and openness o f  the  econom y, the  literacy rate and G D P 
p er cap ita  g row th  rate. O n the o ther hand, he concludes th a t an  increase in  foreign  aid, in  aging o f  
population , in population  density  and in  inflation  has a  negative relationship  w ith  tax  revenue, w hereas 
variab les such as the share o f  agriculture on G D P, fem ale labor force participation, econom ic volatility , 
civil liberties and political rights are statically  insignificant. H e also finds a  positive correlation  betw een 
tax  revenue obtained from  incom e, profits and capital gains and  the level o f  political rights. H ow ever the 
index  o f  civil liberties he uses is negatively  associated  w ith  value added tax , property  taxes and social 
security  revenues.
P iancastrelli (2001), based  on data  o f  75 developed and developing countries over the period 
1985-1995, identifies p er cap ita  G D P, the share o f  industry  in  G D P and trade openness as the m ost
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im portan t determ inants o f  tax  revenue. The share o f  agriculture on G D P is negatively  associated  w ith  tax  
revenue, in  line w ith  o ther studies. P ro fe ta  and  Scabrosetti (2010) analyzed  determ inants o f  tax  revenue o f  
39 developing countries over the period  1990-2004, including 11 A sian, 19 Latin  A m erican  and 9 recent 
m em bers o f  the EU. They identify  statistically  significant d ifferences in  the regional determ inants o f  tax  
revenue. For instance, G D P p e r cap ita  and the debt/G D P ratio w ere no t statically  sign ifican t determ inants 
o f  tax  revenues in  the A sian  econom ies included in the sam ple, bu t w ere positive statistically  significantly  
fo r L atin  A m erican  countries. B u t fo r the w hole sam ple bo th  indicators appear to  have a  positive bu t no t 
alw ays sign ifican t influence. The share o f  agriculture over G D P influences tax  revenue negatively  in 
L atin  A m erica  bu t is no t sign ifican t in A sia, openness o f  the econom y has a  positive im pact on tax  
revenue in  A sia  and  in E urope, bu t a  negative one in L atin  A m erica. The index  o f  dem ocratization  seem s 
to  be positively  linked to  tax  revenue and a  h igher level o f  civil liberties and political rights is associated  
w ith  increased tax  perform ance. F o r L atin  A m erican  countries education , the share o f  popu lation  over 65 
years old, fem ale labor force partic ipation  and the size o f  the shadow  econom y are positive and 
significantly  related  to  tax  revenue, w hereas population  density  is not. F o r A sia  variab les such as 
secondary  school a tta inm ent and urban  population  are no t significant, w hereas the share o f  population  
over 65 years old is negatively  associated  w ith  tax  revenue.
A s highligh ted  by  the above analyses o f  recent econom etric studies, there is no clear pattern  o f  
the significance o f  all the  various potential determ inants o f  tax  perform ance in  developing countries. 
H ow ever, although som e results do vary  according to  the period  analyzed and the sam ple o f  countries 
chosen, in  general, indicators like G D P p e r capita, the share o f  non-agricu ltural activ ities on G D P 
— w hich  m ay be in terpreted  as proxies o f  a  co u n try 's  stage o f  developm ent—  have a  positive, significant 
influence on tax  revenue. A  h igher degree o f  openness and an increasing deb t are usually  associated  w ith  
a  h igher level o f  taxation . M oreover, dem ocratization , b e tter institutions, less corruption , political stability  
and the rule o f  law  are usually  associated  w ith  increased ta x  revenue.
O n the o ther hand, the association  betw een  foreign  aid  and  the shadow  econom y on tax  
perform ance is no t c lear cut. A ccording to  M ahdavi foreign  aid tends to  be linked w ith  low er tax  revenue, 
w hereas G upta  points to  a  d irect e ffect in the  case o f  low  incom e countries bu t a  non-sign ifican t one in 
the case o f  richer countries. The size o f  the  shadow  econom y is positively  associated  w ith  tax  revenue 
according to  P rofeta  and Scabrosetti (2010), w hereas B ird, M artinez V asquez and T org ler (2004) find a 
negative correlation. O ther factors that, according to  the  review ed literature could  have an effect on 
taxation  are conflicts, both  in ternal and external. B esley  and P ersson (2007) analyzed the effects o f  w ars 
on the fiscal capacity  w ith  data  o f  180 countries from  1945 to  1997. They found th a t arm ed conflicts 
affect the capacity  o f  a  governm ent to  co llect tax  revenues: external w ars m ay boost fiscal capacity  as 
governm ents carry  out investm ents financed by  taxes, w hereas in ternal w ars decrease tax  revenue as 
conflicts am ong d ifferen t g roups w eaken  state institutions. In another study, covering 188 countries over 
the  period  1975-2004, C árdenas, E slava and R am irez (2010) find a  negative correlation betw een  in ternal 
conflicts and fiscal capacity  m easured  in  tw o d ifferen t w ays: i) as to ta l tax  revenue as a  percentage o f  
G D P, fo llow ing B esley  and  Persson (2007), and ii) as incom e tax  revenue as share o f  GD P. T hey partly  
confirm  the results o f  the previous study; in  fact, w hereas in ternal conflicts w eaken  state capacity , the 
authors state th a t external conflicts are no t associated  w ith  h igher levels o f  tax  revenue, in  contrast w ith  
B esley  and P ersson (2007). T hey  po in t out th a t m ajo r in ternational w ars shaped fiscal capacity  and  in  part 
contribu ted  to  the  form ation  o f  the m odern  state. External conflicts can have a  positive im pact on fiscal 
capacity  only  i f  the  period  analyzed is long enough (fo r instance B esley  and P ersson analyzed five 
decades) and  i f  m any countries are involved  in it. In addition, th e ir study also indicates th a t the  in tensity  
o f  the in ternal conflic t has an influence on the S ta te 's  capacity  to  co llect tax. T hey find th a t in Colom bia, 
in  1994-2002, k idnappings and forced d isplacem ents tended  to  decrease tax  revenue as a  share o f  G D P as 
they  w eakened  the capacity  to  co llect taxes. O ther variables that, according to  the review ed literature,
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affect tax  revenue are the level o f  education, the density  o f  the population , rate o f  urbanization , fem ale 
labor force partic ipation  and the age com position o f  the population . The p resen t paper has the  aim  o f  
providing recent additional econom etric evidence on the determ inants o f  the structure o f  taxation  in  Latin  
A m erica, w ith  a  special focus on the C aribbean and C entral A m erica.
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The em pirical analysis o f  th is paper is based on data for 32 countries in Latin A m erica and the C aribbean 1 
over the period 1990-2009. A s m entioned in the introduction, the level o f  tax  revenue in  Latin  A m erican 
countries is low. In 2009, it stood on average at 19% o f  G DP, notw ithstanding it had increased m ore than 
four percentage points since 1990. In com parison, in  Europe and in  the O ECD  countries the tax  burden w as 
39.7%  2 and 28.4%  o f  GDP. 3
T ax revenue certainly did no t grow  at the same pace in all countries in  the region in  1990-2009, and 
neither the econom ies expanded at the sam e pace. O n the one hand, som e C aribbean countries like St Kitts 
and N evis, Haiti, T rinidad and Tobago, as w ell as N icaragua in Central A m erica, and C olom bia, Ecuador, 
A rgentina, P lurinational State o f  B oliv ia and Brazil in South A m erica increased th e ir tax  revenues a t an 
annual av erag e  ra te  o f  g ro w th  o v e r and  above 2% . O n the  o th e r hand , in  o th e r co u n trie s  it d ecreased  
— Surinam e, G uyana, B elize—  and in  o ther it augm ented at very  a  slow  pace. In any case, in general the 
overall tax  burden rem ains very sm all especially in Central A m erica and — to a  lesser extent—  in South 
A m erica. M oreover, it is w orrying that in M exico, Haiti, G uatem ala and Panam a, the Central G overnm ent 
collects less than  12 percent o f  the G D P from  taxes, in contrast to  23 .5%  in Brazil o r 18.2%  in A rgentina 4 
(see table 1).
A s tab le  2 show s, in  the reg ion  tax  revenues depend m ore on ind irect taxes than  d irect ones. In 
fact, the  revenue collected  from  the fo rm er is tw ice as h igh  as th a t com ing from  the latter. In addition, 
another characteristic  o f  the structure o f  taxation  in  the reg ion  is the  h igh level o f  evasion and the 
presence o f  so called  special regim es th a t im ply a  sign ifican t loss o f  fiscal revenue to  groups o f  interest. 
In the nex t chapter w e p resen t the functional specification  o f  the econom etric m odel — and discuss its 
results—  used  here to  assess the relevance o f  a  series o f  econom ic and political variab les as determ inants 
o f  ta x  revenue in  Latin  A m erican  countries. The results o f  the em pirical analysis m ay serve as an  input 
no t only fo r the academ ic debate but, hopefully , also fo r policy  m akers.
A m ong the econom ic variab les th a t is a  priori expected  to  have an im pact on tax  revenue stand 
ou t the rate o f  g row th  and the level o f  G D P p er capita. The g row th  perform ance o f  countries in  the region 
has been  uneven, w ith  periods o f  h igh g row th  fo llow ed by others o f  slow  and in  som e countries on 
occasion even negative grow th. M oreover, as is w ell know n in the last th ree decades L atin  A m erica  grew , 
on average, a t a  slow er pace than  E ast A sian  counterparts despite having applied  radical m arket reform s 
in  the 1980s and 1990s. Focusing on the period  1990-2010 one can distinguish  tw o broad  groups o f  
countries in  Central A m erica and  the C aribbean. The first one form ed by  countries th a t experienced, in 
general, h igh g row th  rates o f  real G D P, and includes Panam a, the D om inican  R epublic, T rin idad and 
T obago, C osta R ica and  A ntigua  and  B arbuda. The second conform ed by  G renada, the B aham as, 
Jam aica, B arbados, St L ucia  and  H aiti had  w eak  econom ic grow th. Interesting enough, fo r th is sam ple 
and period, it seem s th a t countries th a t have alw ays had, fo r historical reasons, h igh  level o f  tax  revenue 
— such as the fo rm er B ritish  co lonies— , had  a  w eak g row th  perform ance these years com pared  to  
countries w ith  relative low  tax  revenues level (see tab le  I-1 in annex  I).
II. THE TAX STRUCTURE IN LATIN AMERICA: STYLIZED FACTS
1 Data for Cuba with the desired disaggregation was not available.
2 Source: EUROSTAT, webpage http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/TTY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-11-026/EN/KS-SF-11-026- 
EN.PDF; data related to tax revenue including social contributions of the general government.
3 Source: OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, webpage http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx.
4 Source: CEPALSTAT, related to fiscal revenue of Central Government excluding grants and donations.
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(Percentages o f GDP)
TABLE 1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TAX REVENUE, 1990-2009
Tax revenue as % of GDP
Country
1990 2000 2005 2009
Total 13.8 16.0 18.3 19.0
C aribbean 18.8 20.1 22.6 23.7
Spanish colonies 8.9 10.2 12.1 12.4
Dominican Republic 10.5 12.5 14.6 13.1
Haiti 7.3 7.9 9.7 11.7
British and  D utch colonies 21.6 21.9 24.2 25.4
Antigua and Barbuda 18.4 15.8 19.4 19.3
Bahamas 15.6 16.7 16.8
Barbados 31.1 31.4 32.3
Belize 20.5 21.6
Dominica 24.9 28.4 31.6
Granada 22.3 22.7 23.0 22.9
Guyana 22.9 18.3 20.2 21.6
Jamaica 20.7 22.6 23.4 26.7
St Kitts 16.7 21.2 29.0 26.8
St Vincent and the Grenadines 24.0 23.7 25.5 27.1
St Lucia 26.0 22.6 23.3 28.1
Suriname 27.8 31.1
Trinidad y  Tobago 22.1 26.4 24.7
C entral A m erica 9.8 12.0 12.9 13.3
Costa Rica 11.0 12.3 13.6 13.8
El Salvador 9.3 10.2 12.4 12.4
Guatemala 7.7 11.5 11.5 10.7
Honduras 12.4 13.7 14.5 14.4
Nicaragua 8.1 14.5 16.7 17.7
Panama 10.3 9.6 8.7 10.9
South A m erica and  Mexico 11.7 13.5 15.3 15.4
Argentina 10.2 12.9 15.8 18.2
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 14.5 15.3 20.5
Brazil 19.9 22.7 23.5
Chile 14.7 17.9 18.3 16.1
Colombia 7.0 9.4 12.4 12.9
Ecuador 7.8 10.0 10.1 13.9
Mexico 9.8 9.7 8.8 9.6
Paraguay 10.0 12.0 13.0 14.5
Peru 10.8 12.2 13.6 13.4
Uruguay 14.1 16.4 18.3 18.0




LATIN AM ERICA: D IR EC T, IN D IRECT AND TO TA L TAX REVENUE, 1990-2009
(Percentages o f GDP)
Tax revenue as share of GDP 
1990 2000 2005 2009
Central America 9.8 12.0 12.9 13.3
Caribbean 18.8 20.1 22.6 23.7
South America and Mexico 11.7 13.5 15.3 15.4
Central America
Direct tax revenue as share of GDP
2.7 3.1 4.0 4.9
Caribbean 5.7 6.1 6.8 7.8
South America and Mexico 3.8 4.0 5.1 5.3
Central America
Indirect tax revenue as share of GDP
6.5 8.4 8.8 8.2
Caribbean 11.0 11.6 14.7 14.7
South America and Mexico 6.0 8.2 8.6 8.5
Source: ECLAC, elaborated by the author on the basis of a simple average.
Note: The sum of direct and indirect tax revenue does not coincide with total tax revenue because other taxes 
and tax devolutions are not classifiable as direct and indirect taxes.
A nalyzing the econom ic perform ance o f  the South A m erican  econom ies and  M exico, the pattern  
in  th is regard  is som ew hat sim ilar to  the one m entioned  above o f  the C aribbean and Central A m erica. 
D uring 1990-2009 C hile, A rgentina, Peru  and  U ruguay reg istered  an  average annual rate o f  g row th  o f  real 
G D P h igher th an  2.5% . O n the o ther hand  B olivarian  R epublic o f  V enezuela, M exico and  Paraguay had 
an even less dynam ic perform ance w ith  an average annual G D P grow th  rate around 1%. In addition  it 
should be m entioned  th a t fo r the  region the average rate o f  econom ic expansion p ost 1990 has been  low er 
than  the one th a t characterized  its g row th  path  during 1950-1980. In addition, the reg io n ’s econom ic 
expansion in  recent decades has been m arked  by  episodes o f  h igh  vo latility  and  no t in frequent financial o r 
balance o f  paym ents crisis.
In general fo r the w hole region the evolution o f  tax  revenue does no t exactly  m irro r th a t o f  the 
rate o f  g row th  o f  G D P. There appears to  be som e correlation  on th e ir  cyclical fluctuations, bu t the long­
term  trend  o f  tax  revenue as a  share o f  G D P in the subregions fo llow s d ifferen t patterns from  the 
corresponding long-term  rate o f  econom ic expansion (see figures 1 to  4). The em pirical analysis, reported  
in  the  fo llow ing chapter, explores fo r L atin  A m erica  the statistical significance o f  the am ple set o f  
variab les — suggested  by  the specialized literature—  th a t m ay have a  persisten t influence on tax  revenues 
and capture key  econom ic, po litical, h istorical, dem ographic and even geographic characteristics o f  the 
countries in the region.
FIGURE 1
TAX REVENUE AND GDP GROWTH RATE IN 
CENTRAL AMERICA, 1990-2008
i— i 1----1------1---- 1— i--1------1-1----- 1— i 1----1------1-1------1— i 1----  -4
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Years
—♦—Tax revenue —♦—GDP growth rate
Source: ECLAC.
FIGURE 3
TAX REVENUE AND GDP GROWTH RATE 
IN MEXICO, 1990-2008
-■-Tax revenue —♦—GDP growth rate
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TAX REVENUE AND GDP GROWTH RATE IN 
SOUTH AMERICA, 1990-2008
Years
— Tax revenue —♦—GDP growth rate
Source: ECLAC.
FIGURE 4
TAX REVENUE AND GDP GROWTH RATE 
IN THE CARIBBEAN, 1990-2008
Years
-Tax revenue —♦—GDP growth rate
Source: ECLAC.
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The em pirical analysis is based on an application o f  panel data econom etric m ethods w ith a  balanced panel 
dataset and random  effect regressions utilizing a  sam ple o f  32 countries over the period 1990-2009. 
Follow ing the standard m ethodology, the individual effects in  the random  effects m odel are specified 
through a  variable tha t is uncorrelated w ith the independent variables. In the fixed effects m odels a 
correlation betw een the individual error term  and the predictor variables is assum ed. A ccording to  the 
relevant literature, random  effects m odels are preferred w hen differences betw een countries are assum ed to 
influence the dependent variable (see in ter alia  Torres-Reyna, 2010). R andom  effects m odels tend  to  be 
preferred i f  the num ber o f  individual observations N  is large relative to  the tim e dim ensions, so tha t the 
individual effects can be considered random  (Hsiao, 2004). In fact, random  effects m odels have been w idely 
used in the em pirical studies on the topic o f  the present paper (Profeta, Scabrosetti 2010; G upta, 2007; 
Ranjan, 2011), though som etim es com bined w ith o ther m odels. W e ran regressions using fixed effect 
specifications bu t the results obtained tended no t to  be significantly different from  those derived through 
random  effects m odels. 5
In the adopted  m odel specification, the dependent variable is ta x  revenue as a  share o f  G DP. It 
includes all revenues o f  the C entral G overnm ent co llected  th rough  taxes, bu t excludes gran ts, donations 
and revenue com ing from  petroleum  and  natural resources. 6 D ata  w as derived  from  C E PA LSTA T. 7 It is 
im portan t to  po in t ou t th a t w e also ran  regressions taking the dependent variable e ither as revenue 
co llected  th rough  d irect taxes o r as revenue co llected  th rough  ind irect ones. The procedure fo r the 
inclusion o f  exogenous variab les in  the m odel specification  w as the fo llow ing one: First, w ere considered 
the key  variab les that, according to  the  em pirical results o f  the  literature, m ay a  priori p lay  a  role in 
explain ing tax  revenue. Second, control variab les w ere added w ith  the double purpose to  evaluate th e ir 
e ffect on tax  revenue and  to  strengthen the m odel th rough a  robustness check (table 3).
A . E C O N O M IC  V A R IA B L E S  IN C L U D E D  IN  T H E  E M P IR IC A L  A N A L Y S IS
G D P p er capita, at constant US dollars o f  2000 and expressed in logarithm  serves as a  proxy fo r the level o f  
developm ent o f  a  country. The m odel tested  the relation betw een G D P grow th and tax  revenue in  Latin 
A m erica bu t did no t find consistent evidence (see chapter II). H ow ever there is a  positive correlation 
betw een G D P per capita (expressed in logarithm ) and tax  revenue (see figure II-1 in annex II). 8 The relation 
betw een tax  revenue and the level o f  developm ent o f  a  country has been studied in  the literature. In ter alia 
H inrichs (1966) and Tanzi (1992) found a  positive correlation betw een them . Indeed, according to  W agner’s 
law, since the dem and for public services is incom e elastic, econom ic developm ent is associated w ith an 
increased request fo r public goods and services w hich need to  be financed in ter alia by increasing tax  
revenue (Tanzi, 1987). A lso, developm ent is associated w ith greater State capacity to  levy and collect taxes 
(Celliah, 1971).
III. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY
5 Heteroscedasticity, common in cross sectional data, could not be ruled out and thus error terms do not have constant variance,
the standard errors of the estimates are biased and the estimates may assume “wrong” values. The analysis was done using
STATA and applying standard procedures to correct for this problem.
6 Revenues from Panama Canal transit and from Mexican natural resources are not included. The exception is Trinidad and 
Tobago, where total tax revenue of the Central government includes petroleum revenue..
7 Data on tax revenue was obtained from http://www.eclac.cl/estadisticas/. For many Caribbean countries, data was collected
from other official sources by the author.
8 In all graphs in this chapter, the average tax revenue is captured on the y-axis, and the average coefficient of exogenous 
variables is captured on the x-axis, for 1990-2009.
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TABLE 3
A DIAGRAM ATIC ILLU STRA TIO N  OF THE M O D EL SPECIFICA TIO N  APPRO A CH  
ADOPTED IN TH E REG RESSIO N  ANALYSIS
D e te rm in a n ts  o f  ta x  reve nu e: a g ra p h ic  a p p ro a ch
G D P  p e r  c a p ita  g ro w th  rate 
G D P  p e r cap ita  
sha re  o f a g rico ltu re  on G D P  
o p e n e s s  o f e co n o m y  
d e fic it p re v o u s  ye a r
S e c o n d a ry  sch o o l en ro lm en t 
sha re  o f ove r 65 s  in the po pu la tio n  
fe m a le  la b o u r fo rc e  p a rte c ip a tio n  rate 
u rb an iza tion  
d e n s ity  o f  po pu la tio n  
p o p u la tio n  grow th  
sh a d o w  e co n o m y
C iv il lib e rtie s  
p o litic a l r ig h ts  
re g im e  d u ra b ility  
in te rna l an d  ex te rna l con flic ts  
A N G L O  du m m y
E co n o m ic  in d ica to rs
S o c io  d e m o g ra p h ic  in d ic a to rs
P o lit ica l in d ic a to rs
Inde pe nd en t v a r ia b le s
Source: Elaborated by the author.
C
T a x  r e v e n u e  \ -
o n G D P  J
p e rso n a l in c o m e  ta x  
c o rp o ra te  ta x  
ta x  on p ro p e rty
ta x  on in te rna tion a l trad e  
Ind irect ta x  d o m e s tic  ta x  o n  g o o d s  and s e rv ice s
D e p e n d e n t v a ria b le E le m e n t o f  d e p e n d e n t v a ria b le
The share o f  agriculture over G D P is another variable used  as a  proxy  fo r developm ent. A  strong 
negative re la tion  betw een  agricu ltu re’s share in G D P and ta x  revenue can be expected. In the  developing 
countries it is no t easy  to  tax  the rural sector, since a  large part o f  it consists o f  subsistence and sm all 
farm ers, notoriously  d ifficu lt to  tax  g iven  the large num bers th a t sell th e ir  p roducts in  inform al m arkets 
(S totsky and W oldeM arian , 1997). O n the o ther hand, since m any public secto r activities are urban  based, 
a  declining share o f  agriculture in  G D P tends to  be linked to  an  increase in  dem and fo r public 
expenditures and thus pu t pressure to  raise tax  revenue (Tanzi, 1992). In L atin  A m erica  and C aribbean the 
level o f  tax  revenue on average is low , bu t som e countries like G uyana, D om inica and B elize have a 
relatively  im portan t agricultural sector and  at the sam e tim e relatively  h igh  tax  revenue. D ue to  the h igh 
co llinearity  betw een  the share o f  agriculture in  G D P and G D P p e r cap ita  (-0 .7 7 ), both  indicators m ay 
serve as proxies fo r developm ent, w e took  only “agricu lture” am ong the fixed  and principal variables fo r 
the em pirical analysis, and ran  separate regressions to  evaluate the effect o f  G D P p er cap ita  (expressed in 
logarithm ) on tax  revenue.
T he lite ra tu re  iden tifies the  openness o f  the  econom y, m easu red  by  the sum  o f  exports and  
im ports as a  share o f  G D P (see figure II-2  in  annex  II), as a  p o ten tia l de te rm inan t o f  ta x  revenue even 
th ough  p rev ious analysis are n o t conclusive. T axes on im ports and exports are easy  to  im pose g iven  the 
easily  iden tifiab le  source o f  co llection . F urtherm ore , since open  econom ies are m ore exposed  to  
ex ternal risks, th e ir  governm ents cou ld  be expected  to  b u ild  b e tte r insurance  system s in  o rd er to  p ro tec t 
th e ir  c itizens ag a in st these  risks (R odrik , 1998). F o r these  reasons a  positive  re la tion  b e tw een  tax
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revenue and  trade  openness cou ld  be expected . O n the  o th e r hand , in  m any  develop ing  countries, trade 
libera liza tion  reform s ten d ed  to  decrease ta x  revenues as th ey  low ered  ta riffs  (K een  and  S im one, 2004). 
C aribbean  econom ies show  a  level o f  trad e  openness (108% ) h ig h er th an  C entral A m erica  (91% ) and 
South  A m erica  (49.9% ). 9
A nother variable considered  in the em pirical literature is public debt (as a  percentage o f  GDP). 
U nfortunately , com parable data  w ere n o t available fo r all L atin  A m erican  countries fo r the  chosen  period. 
O ften data  w ere no t com parable, o r did no t correspond to  the sam e aggregate category  o f governm ent, o r 
had  o ther problem s th a t im peded its use fo r com parative purposes. Thus, and in  o rder to  w ork  w ith  no t a 
very  sm all sam ple, in  the  em pirica l analysis w e considered  da ta  on the  fiscal defic it as a  share o f  G D P 
— o f  p rev ious years—  instead  o f  da ta  on debt.
B . P O L IT IC A L  V A R IA B L E S
There is no consensus in  the em pirical literature on the significance o f  political variables — such as the 
level o f  dem ocracy and  the duration  o f  a  po litical reg im e—  as determ inants o f  tax  revenue. O n the one 
hand, according to  som e authors (A cem oglu  and  R obinson, 2006; B oix, 2003), dem ocracy  is im portan t to 
redistribute incom e from  the rich to  the poor, to  create an en larged w elfare state, and a  stronger and  m ore 
effic ien t tax  system , based  m ore on d irect taxes than  on ind irect taxes. In addition , an a  priori assum ption 
is th a t under a  non  dem ocratic  regim e the size o f  the  public  sector w ould  be relatively  sm all, because a 
large part o f  citizens are excluded from  the decision m aking process. Thus a  transition  tow ards a 
dem ocratic  governm ent w ould  coincide w ith  an increase in  taxes and public spending in accordance w ith 
the theory  o f  the m edian  voter, m oving in the d irection o f  a  b e tter red istribu tion  o f  w ealth . O n the o ther 
hand, som e authors, such as B arro  (1979) and  W ittm an (1989), consider th a t the m ain  drivers o f  public 
policy  are no t po litical factors, bu t efficiency considerations. M oreover, unlike B o ix ’s theory , M ulligam  
(2004) d id  no t find  evidence th a t dem ocracies spend m ore in  public services like education, health , 
pension, than  autocracies.
In any case, to  te s t these hypotheses the em pirical analysis re lied  on tw o variab les 10 — civil 
liberties and  political righ ts—  as proxy  o f  the  state o f  dem ocracy. The civil liberties index  captures the 
degree o f  freedom  o f  expression and beliefs, o f  organization , and o f  assem bly. It can be considered as a 
m easure bo th  o f  the  rule o f  law  and, perhaps too , o f  personal autonom y w ithou t in terference from  the 
state. The range o f  the  index varies from  one, the h ighest level o f  civil liberties, and  seven, the low est. 
M ahdavi (2008) used  it as a  p roxy  fo r the level o f  corruption  considering th a t an im provem ent o f  civil 
liberties o f  a  country  should  be associated  w ith  reduced corruption , ow ing to  m ore transparency  and 
accountab ility  w ith in  the public sector. The political rights index  is a  m ixture th a t captures the legal 
prerogatives th a t enable citizens to  participate freely  in the political p rocess th rough  the righ t to  vote and 
to  be vo ted  fo r public office, the existence o f  credible opposition  and o f  po litical rights. It goes from  one, 
the  h ighest level o f  po litical rights, to  seven the low est. There is h igh  co-linearity  am ong these tw o 
indices (0.80). A ccording to  the literature a  positive correlation betw een  the level o f  dem ocracy and tax  
revenue is expected and a  h igher level o f  civil liberties and political rights should be associated  w ith  
h igher tax  revenue (see figure II-3, annex II).
The index o f  regim e durability 11 reports the num ber o f  years since either a  regime took office or a 
transition period has ended as defined by the absence o f stable political institutions. The index takes the first
9 The degree of openness for the subregion is calculated as the average of the corresponding national figures for 1990-2009.
10 See the website from Freedom House www.freedomhouse.org
11 Derived from the policy IV dataset, see www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
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year in office o f  a  new  governm ent as the zero baseline, and each additional year by  the same governm ent is 
counted consecutively until a  new  governm ent takes office and the count is restarted from  zero. Political 
stability m ay be associated w ith a  larger capacity o f  the state to  collect taxes through reliable institutions. 
D um m y variables (see sum m ary regressions 12-15 in annex III) w ere introduced to  investigate possible 
differences o f  regim e taxation betw een countries due to  other political o r historical variables such as internal 
and external conflicts, o r historic heritage like having been a  Spanish or an English colony.
C . S O C IO  D E M O G R A P H IC  V A R IA B L E S
A m ong the im portant socio dem ographic variables considered in  the em pirical literature as a  factor tha t m ay 
influence taxation is the average level o f  education o f  the population, The assum ption is tha t a  higher level 
o f  education should enable citizens to  better understand and com ply w ith tax  codes, to  have a  better access 
to  form al job s and, perhaps too, to  have greater conscience o f  the responsibility or obligation to  pay taxes. In 
the econom etric m odel it w as captured as the average num ber o f  years o f  secondary school attainm ent o f  the 
population (see figure II-4 in annex II). Furtherm ore, according to  literature the percentage o f  elderly in the 
population, m easured by the share o f  people over 65, should be positively associated w ith tax  revenue. 
Pensions becom e the m ain, i f  any at all, source o f  incom e fo r old people. Thus it could be argued tha t States, 
w ith a  h igh or rapidly expanding proportion o f  elderly people, face the pressure to  create a  pension system  
and this can only be done in a  sustainable w ay by increasing taxes. A nother com m on indicator is fem ale 
labor force participation. It is expected to  be positively correlated w ith tax  revenue, as m ore w om en 
em ployed in the form al m arket enlarge the tax  base.
U rban iza tion  should  also  be p ositive ly  co rre la ted  w ith  ta x  revenue. O n the  one hand , it 
increases c itiz e n s’ dem and  fo r p u b lic  goods and  services. O n the  o th e r it ten d s to  fac ilita te  tax  
adm in istra tion  (T anzi, 1987). The density  o f  p o pu la tion  should  be p ositive ly  linked  w ith  ta x  revenue as 
it tends to  reduce the  adm in istra tive  costs o f  ta x  co llec tion  and o f  con tro lling  fo r ta x  evasion  
(A nsari, 1982). A n o th er dem ograph ic  ind ica to r th a t m ay be im portan t in  expla in ing  ta x  revenue is 
p o pu la tion  grow th . R ap id ly  grow ing  p opu la tions p u t add itional p ressu re  on the  ta x  system  in  o rd er to  
reg is te r and  m o n ito r new  tax p ay ers  (B ahl, 2003). T hus a  negative  co rre la tion  am ong tax  revenue and 
the  p o pu la tion  g row th  rate is expected .
D. O T H E R  C O N T R O L  V A R IA B L E S
The em pirical analysis here carried out considered a  num ber o f  additional, say control, variables. One o f  
them  is the size o f  the shadow  econom y o f  the inform al sector. To the extent tha t h igher taxes m ay induce 
inform ality, they augm ent the underground econom y (Schneider, 2005). A ccording to  som e authors, the 
increase o f  tax  rates in the last decades — m ainly in m any developed countries—  represents an im portant 
incentive for com panies and individuals to  w ork in  the inform al econom y (Tanzi, Schuknecht, 1997). The 
enforced legal obligation to  pay taxes is correlated w ith  the perception o f  the citizens regarding the quality 
o f  public services supplied by the state. I f  an increase o f  tax  rates is associated w ith an im provem ent o f  
public goods, a  tax  rise probably w ill face less opposition. A nother variable considered the G IN I coefficient. 
The acute inequality in Latin A m erica is partly  due to  the fact tha t taxation does no t play  a  strong 
redistributive role. There are m any possible explanations: the tax  rates are too  low, the w eight o f  direct tax  
on indirect tax  is too  small, or evasion is high. Low  levels o f  tax  revenue are ultim ately a  consequence o f  the 
refusal o f  the elites to  contribute to  finance public services for the rest o f  the population. M oreover, lack o f  
trust in the fairness o f  the tax  system  and in the institutions can increase the shadow  econom y, tax  evasion 
and even endanger political stability (A lesina and Perotti, 1996).
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IV . R E G R E S S IO N  A N A L Y S IS : F U N C T IO N A L  S P E C IF IC A T IO N  A N D  R E S U L T S
The basic regression m odel o f  tax  revenue as a  linear function o f  selected econom ic and political indicators 
perform ed quite w ell in  our analysis as show n by  the R 2 and the F-test statistics. R elevant results were 
derived using the follow ing exogenous variables: the grow th rate o f  G D P per capita, the share o f  agriculture, 
G D P per capita (expressed in logarithm ), openness o f  econom y and the fiscal deficit o f  the previous year 
and including political variables as presence o f  civil liberties and political rights (regressions 1 and 2 in 
annex III). Extended versions o f  the basic m odel included other control variables (see results o f  regressions 
5 to  11 in  annex III).
A s the first colum n o f  regression  1 in  annex  III show s the share o f  agriculture in  G D P is statically  
sign ifican t and inversely  related to  tax  revenue. A  one percen t g row th  in the share o f  agriculture m ay 
decrease tax  revenue by  0.18% . The im pact is relatively  strong and it is in  line w ith  previous findings (see 
chapter III). T rade openness is statically  significant and has a  slightly  positive relationship  w ith  tax  
revenue: a  one percen t increase in  the openness o f  the econom y, calcu lated  as a  sum  o f  im ports and 
exports as share o f  G D P, m ay boost tax  revenue by 0.04% . For Latin  A m erican  countries, and, as R odrik  
(1998) argues, a  g rea ter size o f  foreign  trade relative to  G D P induces an increase in tax  revenues as trade 
tariffs are easily  im posed and m onitored. P er cap ita  G D P grow th  rate and the fiscal defic it o f  the previous 
y ear w ere no t sign ifican t in  explain ing the tax  revenue.
R egarding political indicators, a  h igher level o f  civil liberties is associated  w ith  h igher tax  
revenue in a  statically  sign ifican t w ay. One percentage po in t increase in  the  index  o f  C ivil L iberties is 
linked to  an  increase o f  1.21 percentage points in tax  revenue as a  share o f  GD P; a  resu lt suggesting tha t 
less in terference by  the State in  restricting civil liberties m ay strengthen the S ta te’s capacity  to  collect 
taxes, perhaps linked too to  an  increased perception  o f  transparency  and accountability  in  the  use o f  fiscal 
resources o r expenditure by  the public adm inistration. In troducing additional political variab les in the 
m odel led to  confirm  a  slightly  stronger influence o f  agriculture and openness on tax  revenue. The index 
o f  po litical rights, unlike th a t o f  civil liberties, w as no t statically  sign ifican t in  the regression  analysis o f  
tax  revenue.
In regression  3 in annex  III the relationship  betw een  tax  revenue and G D P p er capita, calculated  
in  logarithm  at constan t US dollars o f  y ear 2000, is h igh ly  sign ifican t and po sitiv e . A  10% change in  G D P 
p er cap ita  is associated  w ith  a  change in  ta x  revenue o f  0.6 points (as a  percentage o f  G D P). The last 
po litical variable in troduced in  the regression analysis w as regim e durability  (see regression 4). It w as 
statically  significant and positively  related  to  ta x  revenue suggesting th a t an  ex tension  o f  one y ear in the 
duration  o f  a  durab ility  o f  a  regim e is associated  w ith  an increase o f  tax  revenue by  0 .1%  as a  percentage 
o f  GDP.
W hen  additional contro l variables w ere included, in a lm ost all cases th e ir estim ated  coefficients 
show ed the expected signs, as reported  in the previous literature (see chapter III and regression 5-11 in 
annex  III). The level o f  education is positively  and statically  significant. 12 The effect o f  school 
en ro llm ent on tax  revenue seem ed, how ever, quite w eak. One m ore y ear o f  average school a tta inm ent is 
linked to  a  h igher ta x  revenue (o f  0 .06%  as a  share o f  G D P). Fem ale labor force partic ipation  and the age 
o f  population  are sign ifican t and positive, as w ell as the density  o f  population . The o ther tw o 
dem ographics variables, population  g row th  and urbanization , w ere no t statically  significant. The shadow
12 Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development- 
indicators).
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econom y w as statically  sign ifican t w ith  a  negative sign. F inally  w e have to  note th a t the G IN I index, an 
ind icato r o f  inequality , is no t statically  significant. A fte r the in troduction  o f  the contro l indicators the 
resu lt o f  the  first tw o regressions are perhaps reinforced. The civil liberties variable rem ains significant 
and positive; agriculture and trade openness alw ays have the expected signs and lose significance only 
w hen the shadow  econom y and schooling are in troduced into the m odel. G D P p e r cap ita  g row th  rate 
rem ains sign ifican t only  in  three cases on eleven regressions, the  sign is positive as expected  and the 
e ffect o f  econom ic g row th  on taxation  appears m odest. The fiscal defic it o f  p revious years becom es 
significant, bu t only a t 1% and only after having in troduced in the regression  the shadow  econom y and 
the schooling variables, bu t the num ber o f  observations is low er (see tab le  4).
W e conclude this section underlining the fact that the following variables seem to have a  significant, 
positive im pact on tax  revenue: civil liberties, durability o f  the political regime, openness, GD P per capita, 
population density, education and female labor force participation. O ther indicators, such as agriculture and the 
shadow econom y, have a  negative impact. M oreover, the grow th o f G DP per capita is usually not significant 
and, w hen it is significant, it seems to  have a  small im pact on tax  revenues. To sum m arize the results we point 
out that the share o f  agriculture over GDP, civil liberties, G DP per capita, female labor force participation and 
age o f  population m ay have a  strong im pact on tax  revenue. The effect is m ore m odest for: the level o f  
openness o f  the econom y, secondary school enrolm ent and density o f  population.
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TABLE 4
SUM M ARY TABLE OF REG RESSIO N  RESULTS
Tax revenue Total Direct Indirect
Principal variables






































































































Source: Elaborated by the author.
a The GDP per capita growth rate is significant in 4 regressions over 12 and the level of significance is almost 
always at 10%.
Notes: The variable must be significant in the majority of regressions to become significant in the summary table, the 
4 regression with dummy have been counted as one regression.
The stars ***, **, *, indicate, respectively, the statistical significance at the one, five and ten percent level, calculated 
as average of significant values more repeated.
The value of BETA coefficient is the highest among the significant cases.
The insignificant cases are reported in grey.
In the cells it has been reported the Beta value, the statistical significance and the number of significant regressions 
over the total of regressions run.
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To extend the analysis to  tax  com position, w e look again a t the results o f  regressions 1 to  4, and focus on the 
second and th ird  colum ns (see annex III). In them  the dependent variables are respectively direct tax  
revenue (including revenue com ing from  personal and corporate incom e tax, property tax  and others direct 
taxes) and indirect tax  revenue (including revenue com ing from  tax  on sales o r consum ption, taxes on trade 
and other indirect taxes). In these cases a  h igher degree o f  civil liberties is linked w ith a  h igher level o f  
direct tax  revenue, w hereas indirect taxes are not associated w ith  a  higher level o f  civil liberties. M oreover, 
the relation betw een the (second) index o f  dem ocratization, political rights, and direct tax  is highly 
significant and positive, w hereas it is not significant in  case o f  indirect tax. Furtherm ore, the results indicate 
that m ore dem ocratic countries tend to  have a  higher level o f  direct taxes (%  o f  GD P), a  fact tha t no t occurs 
in the case o f  indirect taxes. Thus the view  o f  A cem oglu (2006) and B oix  (2003) seem s to  prevail regarding 
direct taxation. First, dem ocratic countries tend  to  carry out redistributive policies from  the rich to  the poor, 
building up a  w elfare state and a  stronger and m ore efficient tax  system  based to  a  greater extent on direct 
taxes than  on indirect taxes. Second, the transition  tow ard a  dem ocratic governm ent is associated w ith an 
increase o f  taxes and public spending (m edian vo ter theory), m oving in  the direction o f  a  better 
redistribution o f  w ealth. R egarding other variables, G D P per capita grow th rate becom es significant i f  
associated w ith indirect tax  revenue. The effect is positive bu t quite weak.
B. S U B R E G IO N A L  D IF F E R E N C E S  IN  T A X A T IO N : T H E  P A R T IC U L A R IT Y  O F  
C E N T R A L  A M E R IC A  A N D  T H E  C A R IB B E A N
A m ong the dum m y variables we introduced is A N G LO  to m ark countries tha t have been in the past English 
or D utch colonies. 13 A s seen in  table 5, form er English and D utch colonies have a  h igher level o f  tax  
revenue as percentage o f  G DP, alm ost 7.5 points m ore than  the o ther countries o f  Latin A m erica. Barbados, 
Jam aica, Surinam e and St K itties and N evis show  a  high level o f  direct tax  revenue (m ore than  10 percent as 
share o f  GD P), bu t B aham as and A ntigua and B arbuda have a  level o f  d irect tax  revenue, below  4%  o f 
GDP. O n the o ther hand, form er English and D utch colonies do no t have a  taxation  structure tha t diverges 
significantly from  that o f  the o ther countries o f  the region, regarding the prevalence o f  indirect tax  over 
others. H ow ever, they diverge on the level o f  tax  revenue, particularly  w hen considering the capacity o f  the 
Caribbean states to  collect a  higher am ount o f  tax  revenue. Colonial heritages tend  to  be reflected in the 
im portant role in the determ ination o f  tax  revenue and in the shape o f  public institutions. D ifferences 
betw een the Spanish and English colonialism  are reflected in the fiscal policies o f  the countries o f  the region 
(Thirsk, 1997). English colonies inherited institutions able to  penetrate m ore the countryside and create a 
larger form al labor m arket, to  im pose h igher tax  rates. A ll these facts in  part help to  explain the h igher level 
o f  tax  revenue o f  m any Caribbean countries com pared to  Central A m erican and South A m erican econom ies, 
to  collect tax  revenue in a  m ore efficient way. It w ill be interesting in  a  future study to  investigate the im pact 
o f  colonial heritage on institutional elem ents and to  analyze how  these elem ents interact w ith and perhaps 
jo in tly  determ ine the level o f  tax  revenue.
A. STRUCTURE OF TAXATION
13 Anglo includes the following countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Granada, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago.
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TABLE 5
TAX REVENUE, DIVIDED BETW EEN D IR EC T AND IN D IR EC T TAXES IN
THE CARIBBEAN IN 2009
Country
Tax revenue over GDP - 2009
Total Direct Indirect
C aribbean 23.7 7.8 14.7
Spanish colonies 12.4 3.1 8.2
Dominican Republic 13.1 4.1 9.0
Haiti 11.7 2.0 7.5
B ritish and  D utch colonies 25.4 8.6 15.7
Antigua and Barbuda 19.3 3.8 15.5
Belize 21.6 7.8 13.8
Bahamas 16.8 1.8 11.9
Barbados 32.3 15.7 16.6
Dominica 31.6 6.4 25.2
Grenada 22.9 6.4 16.5
Guyana 21.6 8.4 13.0
Jamaica 26.7 10.9 15.8
St Kitts and Nevis 26.8 10.1 16.7
St Vincent and the Grenadines 27.1 7.2 19.9
St Lucia 28.1 8.9 19.2
Suriname 31.1 16.1 14.5
Trinidad y Tobago * 24.7 7.9 6.2
C entral A m erica 13.3 4.9 8.2
Costa Rica 13.8 4.8 8.6
El Salvador 12.4 4.6 7.4
Guatemala 10.7 3.2 7.1
Honduras 14.4 4.8 9.7
Nicaragua 17.7 6.3 11.4
Panama 10.9 6.0 5.1
Source: ECLAC, elaborated by the author on the basis of a simple average.
* In total tax revenue, the petroleum revenue is included.
W e also analyzed  the effect o f  in ternal and external conflicts on tax  revenue by in troducing three 
dum m y variables; conflic t 1 represents the  group o f  countries involved in  an in ternal conflic t o f  a t least 
one y ear duration  since 1980, w hereas conflic t 2 indicates countries involved  in  conflicts o f  at least tw o 
y ear duration. F inally , conflic t 3 refers to  those countries involved in external conflic t since 1980. 14 B oth
14 The data come from the UCDP/PRIO Armed conflict Dataset built as a result of the collaboration between the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Centre for study of Civil Wars of the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo 
(PRIO). Conflict 2 dummy includes the following countries: Colombia, El Salvador Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Peru, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, whereas dummy 1 includes Panama, Paraguay, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, in 
addition to countries already included in dummy 2. Dummy 3 covers countries involved in external conflict since 1980 such 
as Argentina, Ecuador, Grenada, Panama and Peru.
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in ternal conflic t variab les (conflict 1 and conflic t 2) w ere h ighly  significance and negative. C ountries 
involved  in  conflicts o f  at least one y ear tend  to  have a  low er level o f  tax  revenue, losing m ain ly  revenue 
com ing from  indirect taxes; m oreover in case o f  conflicts th a t last m ore than  one year, the capacity  o f  the 
state to  co llect taxes decreases even further, reducing the tax  revenue by  up to  5%. These results support 
the v iew  o f  B ailey  and Persson  (2008). Such conflicts reduce the capacity  o f  the  state to  co llect taxes; 
co m p e titio n  am ong  in te rn a l g ro u p s w ith  d iv e rg en t a im s and  opp o site  in te res ts  w eak en s in stitu tio n s 
— m ainly  the S tate—  by  underm ining its fiscal capacity . O n the o ther hand, contrary  to  som e o f  th e ir 
p redictions, in Latin  A m erica external conflicts do no t seem  neither to  foster fiscal capacity  n o r to  induce 
the states to  co llect m ore resources in  o rder to  face the external th reats and the war. O n the contrary, 
external w ars, like in ternal ones, w eaken  the S ta te’s capacity  to  collect taxes and thus reduce the tax  
revenue. The dum m y variable conflic t 3 w as no t h igh ly  sign ifican t — only at 10%—  w ith  an inverse 
relation to  d irect tax  revenue. To sum m arize, in ternal conflicts in  L atin  A m erican  tended  to  w eaken  fiscal 
pressure, and reduce revenues from  ind irect taxes. In  case o f  external conflic t the resu lt is sim ilar, bu t the 
im pact is fe lt m ore on d irect ones.
The level o f  taxation  as a  percentage o f  G D P in C entral A m erican  countries increased  in  the last 
tw o decade by  an average 3.5 points. N evertheless, it stood a t only 13.3%  o f  G D P in 2009, m uch low er 
than  in  others countries o f  the region and am ong the low est in  the w orld. In fact, in  th a t period, tax  
revenue increased significantly  only in  N icaragua, by 10 points o f  G D P. It augm ented betw een  tw o and 
three po in ts o f  G D P in El Salvador, G uatem ala, H onduras and C osta R ica, and  rem ained  ra ther constan t 
in  Panam a. O n the o ther hand, bo th  as reflected  by  the change in  the share o f  agriculture in  G D P and  in 
the level G D P p er capita, C entral A m erican  countries has in  the last tw o decades (1990-2009) gone 
th rough  an im portan t transform ation  and developm ent (see tab le  6). E xcep t in N icaragua, w here it 
increased by 3 points, in  the o ther countries o f  the  region the share o f  agriculture considerably  
dim inished. It decreased  m ore than  10 points in  H onduras and G uatem ala, bu t less in  C osta  R ica, Panam a 
and El Salvador, w here ag ricu ltu re’s share in G D P w as already  m uch low er. D uring the period  covered, 
G D P p er cap ita  rose at an  annual rate o f  2 .6% , a lm ost one po in t above the regional average thus reducing 
the gap. In fact, P anam a’s, C osta R ica ’s and El Salvador’s G D P p er cap ita  is defin itely  h igher than  th a t in 
N icaragua, H onduras and G uatem ala.
H inrichs, 1966; Tanzi, 1992 and 1987, and C elliah, 1971 found a  positive correlation  betw een  the 
level o f  developm ent and tax  revenue (see chap ter III). H ow ever, the tax  burden  in  C entral A m erica  
increased only  m odestly  in  the  last tw o decades. W hy  does tax  revenue rem ain  so m odest relative to  o ther 
countries in  the  region? First, C entral A m erica’s colonial heritage shaped in  special w ays the institu tions 
th a t have adversely  influenced, underm ined  its fiscal capacities. B ritish  co lonialism  left beh ind  relatively  
effic ien t institu tions able to  collect taxes, w ith  a  form al labor m arket and a  m odern  fiscal system  in the 
C aribbean. Secondly, except fo r H onduras and C osta R ica, the  countries in  the reg ion  w ere involved  in 
in ternal conflicts after 1980. These conflicts w eakened  the institu tional capacity  and fiscal capacity  o f  the 
states to  collect taxes. The only country  o f  the region involved in  an external w ar has been  Panam a. 
A ccord ing  to  Cardenas, E slava and R am irez (2010), external conflicts do no t increase the fiscal capacity  
o f  the states if  the  duration o f  the conflic t is short o r if  the conflic t does no t involve m any countries, as 
occurred in  the case o f  the US invasion  o f  P anam a in 1989.
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TABLE 6
SHARE OF A G RICU LTU RE IN GDP AND GDP P E R  CAPITA, 1990-2009
Country 1990 2000 2005 2009 Change 1990 to 2009
Share of agriculture in GDP
Central America 17.6 14.5 12.0 11.5 -6.0
Caribbean 13.7 9.4 8.3 6.9 -6.7
South America and Mexico 11.7 8.1 8.7 8.6 -3.1
A verage 14.3 10.7 9.7 9.0 -5 .3
Costa Rica 12.3 9.5 8.7 7.1 -5.2
El Salvador 17.4 10.5 10.5 12.5 -4.9
Guatemala 25.9 22.8 13.4 12.4 -13.5
Honduras 22.4 15.9 13.7 12.5 -10.0
Nicaragua * na 20.9 19.0 18.8 3.3
Panama 9.8 7.2 7.0 6.0 -3.8
A verage 17.6 14.5 12.0 11.5 -6 .0
Country 1990 2000 2005 2009 Annual growth rate (%)
GDP per capita
Central America 1 800 2 306 2 544 2 911 2.6
Caribbean 4 711 5 274 5 769 5 828 1.1
South America and Mexico 3 147 3 830 4 095 4 653 2.1
A verage 3 219 3 803 4 136 4 464 1.7
Costa Rica 3 111 4 057 4 501 5 043 2.6
El Salvador 1 571 2 209 2 424 2 566 2.6
Guatemala 1 446 1 718 1 762 1 857 1.3
Honduras 1 049 1 141 1 294 1 380 1.5
Nicaragua 682 772 843 875 1.3
Panama 2 940 3 938 4 440 5 744 3.6
A verage 1 800 2 306 2 544 2 911 2.6
Source: World Bank, World development indicators.
Note: GDP per capita annual growth rate calculated at constant US Dollars off 2000.
F inally , a  th ird  reason fo r the low  level o f  taxation  in  C entral A m erica is the w eakness o f  
dem ocracy. In fact, in C entral A m erica  the civil liberties and the political rights index  have no t im proved, 
on average, from  1990 until 2009 (see tab le  7). The first one has w orsened, w hereas the second one has 
rem ained unchanged. In particular, although there has been, during the period  analyzed, a  h igh level o f  
civil liberties in  C osta R ica  and Panam a, in N icaragua, H onduras and G uatem ala the ind ica to r o f  civil 
liberties did no t im prove. A lthough it im proved  in  El Salvador, it d id  no t reach a  satisfactory  level. 
R egarding the ind icato r o f  political rights, C osta R ica, Panam a and  El S alvador show  a  h igher level, bu t 
in  N icaragua, H onduras and G uatem ala the index  deteriorated  in  the last tw o decades.
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TABLE 7
CIV IL LIB ER TIES AND PO L IT IC A L  RIG H TS INDEXES
Index of civil liberties
1990 2000 2005 2009
Central America 2.8 2.8 2.7 3.0
Caribbean 2.3 1.9 2.0 1.9
South America and Mexico 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.6
Average 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.5
Costa Rica 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.0
El Salvador 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Guatemala 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Honduras 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0
Nicaragua 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0
Panama 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Average 2.8 2.8 2.7 3.0
Index of political rights
1990 2000 2005 2009
Central America 2.7 2.2 2.3 2.7
Caribbean 2.3 1.9 2.0 1.7
South America and Mexico 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.5
Average 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.3
Costa Rica 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
El Salvador 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Guatemala 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0
Honduras 2.0 3.0 3.0 4.0
Nicaragua 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0
Panama 4.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Average 2.7 2.2 2.3 2.7
Source: Freedom House.
A s seen in  chapter III, in  countries w here the index  suggests a, say, low  level o f  dem ocracy, large 
part o f  the citizens m ay be excluded from  the key  decision  m aking process. A nd perhaps there are few  or 
p ractically  no po litical parties tha t represent the  interests o f  the electorate, being largely  in fluenced  by  the 
vested  in terests o f  lobbies and elites (G rossm an and H elpm an, 1994). A ccording to  th is  v iew , elites exert 
pow er and pressure on po litical parties in  o rder to  defend th e ir in terests, and in particu lar to  p revent taxes 
from  rising and keep th e ir  special priv ileges and exem ptions. T here is a  perception  tha t in  m any L atin  
A m erican  countries pow erfu l landow ners — and o ther p riv ileged  classes—  has been  able to  b lock  tax  
reform s tha t in tend to  raise d irect taxes on land and incom e (The W orld  B ank G roup, 2008).
S um m arizing, the low  level o f  taxes in  C entral A m erica is m ain ly  due to  a  poorly  w orking or 
ineffective dem ocracy linked to  a  w eak representativeness o f  political parties, to  h isto rical heritage — the 
Spanish co lonialism —  and to  the sequels o f  in ternal conflicts th a t h it the region during the 1980s and 
1990s. O n the o ther hand, the in  general h igher level o f  the ta x  revenues relative to  G D P in the C aribbean,
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m ainly  in  the fo rm er B ritish  and D utch colonies, reflects a  m ore effective dem ocracy, a  low er num ber and 
less in tense conflicts, and som ew hat be tter institu tions due to  the colonial legacy.
C . T H E  T A X  E F F O R T  IN D E X
In line w ith  C helliah (1971), Bahl (1971), Chelliah, Bass, K elly  (1975) and G upta (2007) we estim ated the 
tax  effort (as percentage o f  G D P) as the ratio o f  actual tax  revenue to  potential revenue. The potential 
revenue w as calculated by using the regression 1 (see annex III), dropping the no t statically significant 
variables. I f  the index o f  tax  effort is greater than  one, it m eans that the countries are collecting a  higher 
am ount o f  tax  revenue than  the am ount tha t is predicted, estim ated by  the regression analysis o f  the 
long-term  determ inants o f  tax  revenue considering the countries’ specific econom ic, social and institutional 
conditions (Piancastelli, 2001).
W e inserted  in  the regression fo r each country, the average value o f  the  th ree ind icators fo r the 
periods 1990-1994 and 2005-2009, in order to  calculate the  poten tia l tax  burden. The average value o f  
five years w as used  in order to  m inim ize the possib le effect o f  ex traord inary  events. Table 8 reports the 
tax  effort index  fo r the countries o f  the region. F o r the period  o f  analysis, the  results suggest th a t countries 
th a t exh ib it a  h igher tax  effort also have a  h igher tax  burden. The tax  effort is on average h igher in  the 
C aribbean than  in  the rest o f  the region. In  the C aribbean, w ith  the exception o f  B aham as and 
D om inican  R epublic, the index  is over one, thus indicating th a t these countries have been able to  increase 
th e ir  capacity  to  collect tax  revenue over and above w hat it w ould  have been p red icted  by  the long-term  
structural determ inants. C entral A m erican  econom ies have an  index  o f  tax  effort low er than  one, w ith 
N icaragua being the exception th a t in the last decades considerably  increased its tax  burden. Thus, this 
subregion faces key  obstacles th a t im pede h er to  even achieve the, actually  low , level o f  taxation  g iven  by 
its revenue potential. M exico and South A m erican  countries show  on average a  level o f  tax  effort close to 
one bu t w ith  large variance. For instance, M exico and E cuador have a  level o f  tax  revenue ra ther m odest 
com pared  w ith  th e ir  structural potential, unlike B razil and Plurinational State o f  B olivia, w hich  show  a 
h igh  value.
C om paring the periods 1990-1994 and 2005-2009, the fiscal e ffo rt index  has increased in  the 
three sub-regions, w ith  som e exceptions. In Central A m erica  the index  decreased  in  P anam a and 
H onduras, in  the C aribbean it d im inished in  B aham as, G uyana and Santa Lucia, and in the rest o f  the 
region it decreased  in  M exico and Chile. In  addition  it seem s th a t the C aribbean countries, in particu lar 
those th a t have been in the  past E nglish  o r D utch colonies, show  a  relatively  strong fiscal capacity , w ith 
m ore effic iency  to  co llect tax  revenue. C entral A m erican  econom ies have a  reduced capacity  to  co llect tax  













(%  of G DP) Index of tax
Variance 
between real
Real Potential effort and potential 
tax revenue
Real Potential effort and potential 
tax revenue
Dominica 24.1 18.1 1.33 5.97 30.0 18.5 1.62 11.50
Suriname na 15.2 na na 29.0 18.5 1.57 10.5
Barbados 28.2 20.2 1.40 8.03 32.8 21.8 1.51 11.06
Trinidad y  Tobago na 19.8 na na 28.3 20.2 1.40 8.04
Jamaica 20.6 18.6 1.11 2.01 24.6 18.0 1.36 6.55
St Vincent and the 
Grenadines 22.8 18.8 1.21 4.01 27.0 20.3 1.33 6.68
St Kitts and Nevis 16.4 21.0 0.78 -4.60 28.1 21.2 1.33 6.90
Granada 22.6 18.4 1.23 4.20 23.5 19.1 1.23 4.46
St Lucia 26.7 19.8 1.35 6.97 25.6 21.5 1.19 4.18
Belize na 18.4 na na 21.7 18.7 1.16 3.0
Guyana 22.2 17.3 1.28 4.91 20.8 18.7 1.11 2.12
Antigua and 
Barbuda 17.6 21.1 0.84 -3.47 20.6 20.6 1.00 0.03
Dominican
Republic 10.5 16.3 0.64 -5.84 14.7 17.7 0.83 -3.03
Bahamas 15.8 19.4 0.81 -3.62 16.7 21.0 0.79 -4.34
Haiti 5.3 na na na 10.6 na na na
Average 20.7 19.0 1.09 1.69 24.5 19.7 1.25 4.83
Nicaragua 10.9 13.3 0.82 -2.44 17.7 15.5 1.14 2.18
Honduras 12.9 14.6 0.88 -1.72 15.3 17.7 0.87 -2.38
E l Salvador 9.8 14.2 0.69 -4.40 12.9 16.1 0.80 -3.18
Guatemala 8.4 10.9 0.77 -2.46 11.6 14.6 0.80 -2.97
Costa Rica 11.6 17.7 0.65 -6.15 14.4 19.9 0.73 -5.45
Panama 10.6 21.2 0.50 -10.59 10.2 20.8 0.49 -10.64
Average 10.7 15.3 0.70 -4.63 13.7 17.4 0.79 -3.74
Plurinational State 
of Bolivia
15.8 14.4 1.09 1.31 23.0 15.9 1.45 7.10
Brazil na 14.3 na na 23.2 16.6 1.40 6.6
Argentina 12.1 15.0 0.81 -2.86 17.1 16.7 1.03 0.42
Uruguay 14.4 16.6 0.87 -2.23 18.2 18.1 1.01 0.10
Bolivarian 
Republic of 
Venezuela 15.4 16.6 0.93 -1.18 14.9 15.6 0.95 -0.75
Chile 16.6 17.1 0.97 -0.51 18.6 19.8 0.94 -1.26
Peru 12.0 13.3 0.90 -1.32 14.6 16.0 0.91 -1.42
Colombia 8.2 13.0 0.63 -4.83 13.1 15.1 0.87 -1.93
Paraguay 10.5 14.3 0.73 -3.87 13.2 15.7 0.84 -2.48
Ecuador 7.3 na na na 11.4 17.0 0.67 -5.6
Mexico 10.1 14.8 0.68 -4.67 8.8 17.1 0.52 -8.28
Average 12.8 15.0 0.85 -2.24 16.0 16.7 0.96 -0.68
Source: ECLAC, elaborated by the author.
na: not available.
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A s is w ell know n, in  panel data regressions the sam ple o f  countries chosen and the period covered fo r the 
analysis m ay affect the results on the significance o f  some o f  the, say, exogenous variables considered as is 
the case on such studies on taxation. Taking account these considerations, this paper focus on taxation 
exclusively in Latin  A m erica and Caribbean countries. Due to  reasons related to  data availability and 
com parability, w e restricted the analysis to  the period 1990-2009. The m ain  purpose o f  the study w as to 
identify the long-term  variables — including historical, econom ic, social and political factors—  that 
significantly influence taxation  in  the countries o f  the region. A  second purpose o f  the study w as to  have a 
better understanding o f  the potential regional differences in the tax  effort o f  each country, m easured by  the 
gap betw een its actual and its potential tax  revenue.
The em pirical results o f  the panel m odels here bu ilt and econom etrically  tested  indicate tha t G D P 
p er cap ita  and openness o f  the  econom y are positively  related to  tax  revenue in  a  statically  significant 
w ay . The share o f  agriculture over G D P and  the size o f  the  shadow  econom y are also statically  
significant, but negatively  associated  w ith  tax  revenue. O n the o ther hand, p er cap ita  G D P grow th  rate 
and lagged fiscal deficits o f  the previous y ear w ere alm ost alw ays no t statically  significant. H ow ever, the 
estim ated  m odels tha t focused exclusively  on indirect taxes iden tified  G D P grow th  as a  significant 
influence w ith  a  positive sign . In  line w ith  previous literature, our w orks indicates tha t in  L atin  A m erica  
the level o f  developm ent, as p roxy  by  the inverse o f  the share o f  agriculture in G D P and by  G D P p er 
capita, has a  strong and positive influence on the tax  burden . M oving to  socio dem ographics determ inants 
the study found ou t th a t the level o f  education, fem ale labor force partic ipation  and the population  density  
have a  positive and significant im pact on tax  revenue, bu t the  level o f  u rbanization  and  the rate o f  
population  g row th  w ere no t significant. A m ong o ther indicators analyzed, an  especially  strong positive 
association  w as found betw een  taxation  and the share o f  w om en em ployed  in  the form al m arket and by 
the share o f  people over 65  years o ld . W ith  the exception  o f  urbanization, tha t is usually  significant and 
positively  associated  w ith  tax  revenue, the others socio dem ographics variables are in  line w ith  previous, 
recent studies.
C oncerning the political variables, a  h igher degree o f  civil liberties and m ore po litical stability , as 
m easured  by  the durab ility  o f  the political regim e, are associated  w ith  h igher ta x  revenue. The political 
rights index  is no t statically  significant, unlike P rofeta  and Scabrosetti (2010) th a t find  a  positive 
correlation  betw een  them . H ow ever, i f  w e deepen the analysis on the structure o f  taxation , w e find  that 
the level o f  political rights becom es h ighly  significant and positive as a  determ inant o f  d irect tax  
revenues, bu t no t o f  ind irect taxes. It w as also suggested  th a t in  the region the indicators associated  w ith  a 
say m ore dem ocratic  governm ents usually  reg ister a  h igher level o f  d irect tax  revenues, perhaps due to  
th e ir  com m itm ent to  redistributive policies. O n the contrary, a  h igher level o f  ind irect taxes is no t usually  
linked w ith  an increased degree o f  civil liberties and political rights. This resu lt on the positive correlation  
betw een  level o f  dem ocracy and  structure o f  taxation  diverges from  P rofeta  and  Scabrosetti (2010), w ho 
find  no evidence o f  th a t. W e m ust underline tha t th e ir  study covers less countries (19 w ith  only the 
D om inican  R epublic am ong the C aribbean) over a  shorter period  o f  tim e (1990-2004).
W e found tha t the structure o f  taxation  does no t diverge significantly  am ong the three regions 
analyzed (South  A m erica  p lus M exico, C entral A m erica  and  the C aribbean); all have a  predom inance o f  
ind irect taxes over d irect ones. M oreover, w e have identified  h istorical and political factors w hich  help  to 
explain  regional differences on taxation : the  colonial heritage, the in ternal conflicts tha t have hit the 
region from  the beginning  o f  the eighties un til the end o f  the last century , and a  num ber o f  indicators o f  
the ex ten t o f  dem ocracy . These factors, in d ifferent w ays, shape the fiscal capacity  o f  the  countries and
V. CONCLUSIONS
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th e ir  d ifferen t tax  burdens and com position. The C aribbean region, in  particu lar the fo rm er B ritish  and 
D utch colonies, show s a  h igher level o f  tax  revenue, w hich  is c loser to  the w estern  standards. This is due 
to  th e ir colonial legacy, a  h igher level o f  civil liberties and po litical rights and a  reduced  presence o f  
conflicts. O n the contrary, C entral A m erican  countries have one o f  the low est levels o f  tax  revenue in  the 
w orld , representing  only  13.3%  o f  G D P in 2009. The tax  effort m odel calculations here carried  out, 
confirm  our findings.
In addition, despite the  increased tax  revenue, the  im provem ent in  the level o f  developm ent and 
the econom ic g row th  observed  in  the period  analyzed (1990-2009), the  tax  burden  in  Latin  A m erica  and 
in  the C aribbean has rem ained  too  m odest com pared  w ith  o ther w orld  regions. C onsequently , public 
expenditures are very  lim ited  and the level o f  inequality  is acute as the fiscal system  does no t exert a 
re levant redistributive im pact. One o f  the m ain  challenges o f  the L atin  A m erican  countries in  the near 
future is to  strengthen th e ir  taxation  capacity  in  o rder to  im prove public services, reduce inequalities and 
prom ote sustainable econom ic grow th. In  fact, th is m ay  be the only  w ay to  reconcile econom ic grow th 
and equality . F iscal po licy  is a  key  tool. A  fiscal reform  th a t enlarges the tax  basis, creates an efficien t 
fiscal system  and elim inates special ta x  regim es and  exem ptions is a  necessary  step fo r m ost countries in 
the region, and in  particu lar C entral A m erica, to  have sufficient fiscal resources th a t m ay help  to  push 
forw ard an effective agenda fo r developm ent th a t does prom ote grow th, ensures a  m ajo r reduction  in 
poverty  and inequality .
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A N N E X E S  
A N N E X  I: E C O N O M IC  V A R IA B L E S
TABLE I-1 
ECO N O M IC VARIABLES
Economic data 
country
Tax revenue as %  
of GDP
G DP per capita 
growth rate
G DP per capita U SD  
costant 2000
Share of agriculture 





















Total 15.4 18.0 1.9 1.8 3 781 4 556 12.4 9.1 84.5 87.2
Caribbean 19.5 22.3 2.0 1.5 4 625 5 677 11.7 8.1 113.0 107.3
Spanish
colonies 8.7 11.7 1.0 1.3 1 289 1 743 10.6 6.9 58.4 63.4
Dominican
Republic 11.0 13.9 4.2 3.5 2 142 3 091 10.6 6.9 78.3 71.8
Haiti 6.5 9.4 -2.3 -0.9 436 394 38.4 54.9
British  and
Dutch
colonies 21.4 24.0 2.1 1.5 5 139 6 283 11.8 8.2 121.4 114.0
Antigua and 
Barbuda 17.7 19.2 1.1 2.0 8 205 9 879 4.0 3.6 167.1 129.5
Bahamas 15.8 15.7 0.3 -1.3 16 022 17 845 2.8 1.8 101.8 95.1
Barbados 29.2 32.3 1.8 -0.3 8 623 9 969 6.8 3.7 108.4 119.2
Belize 21.9 2.3 0.8 2 840 3 596 17.6 14.9 108.1 120.9
Dominica 23.7 27.3 2.1 1.6 3 398 3 954 21.0 18.1 119.9 108.6
Grenada 22.2 23.0 2.7 0.3 3 133 4 430 10.2 6.9 110.2 102.7
Guyana 20.4 19.6 5.5 1.0 793 981 37.5 27.8 217.3 201.0
Jamaica 20.8 23.7 1.0 1.0 3 488 3 705 8.2 6.1 105.0 97.5
St Kitts and 
Nevis 19.1 25.5 4.2 0.6 6 336 7 815 5.6 2.9 126.9 113.2
St Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines 23.1 26.2 3.2 3.6 2 583 3 771 14.3 8.5 125.5 108.2
St Lucia 24.2 23.8 1.9 0.4 4 245 4 648 10.3 5.1 137.1 118.7
Suriname 28.6 -0.6 3.8 1 964 2 289 12.8 7.0 62.9 67.4
Trinidad y 
Tobago 19.4 24.7 2.2 5.8 5 175 8 792 2.4 0.8 87.8 100.2
Central
Am erica 11.2 12.9 2.2 2.1 2 038 2 570 17.3 12.3 85.1 97.1
Costa Rica 12.0 13.8 3.0 2.4 3 531 4 534 12.8 8.5 80.8 95.8
E l Salvador 10.1 11.9 3.7 1.7 1 884 2 421 14.6 10.6 55.7 69.9
Guatemala 9.4 11.7 1.8 0.9 1 567 1 786 24.5 14.4 43.4 64.1
Honduras 13.1 14.5 0.5 2.1 1 097 1 277 21.2 13.6 87.2 125.6
Nicaragua 12.2 16.0 1.1 1.4 679 831 22.8 19.3 66.3 86.0





Tax revenue as %  
of GDP
G DP per capita 
growth rate
G DP per capita U SD  
constant 2000
Share of agriculture 























and Mexico 13.0 14.9 1.7 2.2 3 581 4 111 10.3 8.6 45.4 54.5
Argentina 12.3 15.3 3.8 2.8 7 216 8 174 5.9 8.6 18.7 38.3
Plurinational 
State of 
Bolivia 15.4 18.6 1.6 1.9 942 1 073 16.4 14.4 48.7 61.9
Brazil 18.4 22.2 0.8 2.0 3 503 4 002 6.9 6.1 17.2 25.7
Chile 17.0 18.1 4.9 2.5 4 063 5 543 8.1 4.6 57.4 72.0
Colombia 8.7 12.0 0.6 2.5 2 488 2 798 15.1 8.3 35.4 35.8
Ecuador 7.5 10.9 -0.2 3.5 1 330 1 545 7.0 56.5 66.2
Mexico 9.6 9.4 1.4 0.4 5 214 6 149 6.2 3.9 49.0 56.9
Paraguay 11.6 12.6 0.1 0.3 1 432 1 376 21.9 19.9 95.3 98.1
Peru 12.8 13.6 2.2 2.0 1 854 2 393 8.8 7.6 30.1 41.9
Uruguay 14.8 17.8 3.4 2.4 6 259 7 131 8.1 9.8 38.3 51.9
Bolivarian 
Republic of 
Venezuela 14.6 13.3 -0.2 1.8 5 087 5 037 5.2 4.2 52.3 50.9




FIG U R E II-1
CO RRELA TIO N  BETW EEN TAX REVENUE AND GDP 
P E R  CAPITA
GDP per capita in logarithm
1 95% CI Fitted values
• South America and Mexico ■ Caribbean
• Central America
Source: ECLAC.
FIG U R E II-2
C O RRELA TIO N  BETW EEN TAX REVENUE AND TRADE OPENNESS
O F AN ECONOM Y
Lack of civil liberties
1 95% CI Fitted values




FIG U R E II-3
CO RRELA TIO N  BETW EEN TAX REVENUE AND CIV IL 
LIB ER TIES INDEX
•  BRA
•  T TO  V C T LCA
•  j a g r Bl z a
•  ATG
•  BHS
I  V E N  •  N IC  H ND
•  d o M c r i  p r y







1 95% CI Fitted values
• South America and Mexico • Caribbean
• Central America
Source: ECLAC and Freedom House, Inc.
FIG U R E II-4
CO RRELA TIO N  BETW EEN TAX REVENUE AND LEV EL OF EDUCATION
Education
1  95% CI -  Fitted values
• South Am erica and Mexico • Caribbean
• Central America
Source: ECLAC and World Bank.
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R E S U L T S  O F  T H E  R E G R E S S IO N S





Const 18.9022 * * * 6.7685 *** 10.7387 ***
2.3880 0.0000 1.0157 0.0000 1.2471 0.0000
Gdpvar per capita 0.0352 -0.0031 0.0624 ***
0.0245 0.1500 0.0195 0.8750 0.0154 0.0000
Agriculture -0.1810 ** -0.0732 -0.0985 ***
0.0752 0.0160 0.0447 0.1020 0.0385 0.0100
Openness 0.0382 ** 0.0209 ** 0.0207 **
0.0160 0.0170 0.0086 0.0150 0.0084 0.0130
Deficit previous year -0.0014 0.0580 ** -0.0061
0.0608 0.9810 0.0244 0.0180 0.0345 0.8590
Lack of civil liberties -1.2190 *** -0.9490 *** -0.2242
0.3021 0.0000 0.2072 0.0000 0.2137 0.2940
Number of observations 495 440 440
Countries 31 30 30
R2 within 0.216 0.298 0.144
R2 between 0.350 0.121 0.224
R2 overall 0.346 0.142 0.212
Total Direct Indirect
Regression 2 re re re
Tax revenue
Const 16.9030 *** 5.4098 *** 10.3487 ***
2.4133 0.0000 1.1904 0.0000 1.2592 0.0000
Gdpvar per capita 0.0392 0.0001 0.0668 ***
0.0254 0.1220 0.0190 0.9950 0.0156 0.0000
Agriculture 0.2337 *** -0.1109 ** -0.1151 ***
0.0806 0.0040 0.0504 0.0280 0.0374 0.0020
Openness 0.0403 ** 0.0236 ** 0.0189 **
0.0173 0.0200 0.0113 0.0360 0.0092 0.0390
Deficit previous year 0.0044 0.0534 * -0.0007
0.0571 0.9390 0.0307 0.0810 0.0353 0.9850
Lack of political rights -0.2888 -0.4040 *** 0.0720
0.2335 0.2160 0.1255 0.0010 0.1491 0.6290
Number of observations 495 440 440
Countries 31 30 30
R2 within 0.159 0.206 0.150
R2 between 0.230 0.143 0.095











Const -35.2798 *** -20.4774 *** -5.3654
10.3925 0.0010 4.7803 0.0000 5.5506 0.3340
Gdpvar per capita 0.0296 -0.0103 0.0625 ***
0.0272 0.2760 0.0181 0.5700 0.0154 0.0000
Openness 0.0436 *** 0.0219 *** 0.0254 ***
0.0141 0.0020 0.0073 0.0030 0.0077 0.0010
Deficit previous year -0.0290 0.0306 -0.0217
0.0533 0.5870 0.0239 0.2000 0.0356 0.5420
Lack of civil
liberties -0.5494 ** -0.5313 *** -0.1215
0.2378 0.0210 0.1747 0.0020 0.1970 0.5370
Log gdp per capita 6.1957 * * * 3.1215 *** 1.7661 **
1.3501 0.0000 0.5915 0.0000 0.7285 0.0150
Number of
observations 536 481 481
Countries 32 31 31
R2 within 0.361 0.395 0.158
R2 between 0.269 0.133 0.265
R2 overall 0.290 0.180 0.252
Total Direct Indirect
Regression 4 re re re
Tax revenue
Const 13.7021 *** 4.8296 *** 6.6783 ***
2.2214 0.0000 1.5219 0.0020 1.3780 0.0000
Gdpvar per capita 0.0440 0.0240 0.0513 ***
0.0293 0.1320 0.0167 0.1510 0.0187 0.0060
Agriculture -0.0879 -0.0507 -0.0799 **
0.0598 0.1420 0.0452 0.2630 0.0329 0.0150
Openness 0.0341 *** 0.0170 ** 0.0153 **
0.0125 0.0060 0.0077 0.0270 0.0071 0.0310
Deficit previous year 0.1402 0.0653 -0.0587
0.0862 0.1040 0.0448 0.1450 0.0373 0.1150
Lack o f civil liberties -0.9250 ** -0.7036 *** 0.1134
0 3664 0 0120 0 2699 0 0090 0 1838 0 5370
Durability 0 1008 *** 0 0528 * 0 0457 *
0 0355 0 0050 0 0306 0 0850 0 0241 0 0570
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Table III-1 (concluded)
Number of observations 329 326 326
Countries 20 20 20
R2 within 0.450 0.386 0.253
R2 between 0.121 0.095 0.008
R2 overall 0.091 0.105 0.003
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Note: The stars ***, **, * indicate respectively the statistical significance at the one, five and ten percent 
level. The first value below “re” is the coefficient value that indicates the slope of regression line, the value 
below the coefficient is the standard error, whereas the value below the star is the P value.
TABLE III-2 
CONTROL VARIABLES REGRESSIONS
5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Regressions 5-11 re re re re re re re
T ax revenue in GDP
Const 13.7119 *** 8.8239 *** 10.6967 *** 18.6855 *** 15.0133 *** 17.3763 *** 19.9389 ***
2.8131 0.0000 3.0793 0.0040 2.4172 0.0000 2.2747 0.0000 2.3739 0.0000 4.7655 0.0000 3.2987 0.0000
Gdpvar per capita 0.0744 *** 0.0523 ** 0.0275 0.0369 0.0364 0.0345 0.0472 *
0.0221 0.0010 0.0261 0.0450 0.0255 0.2810 0.0234 0.1150 0.0232 0.1180 0.0239 0.1490 0.0275 0.0860
Agriculture -0.1224 -0.0704 -0.0975 * -0.1831 ** -0.1279 * -0.1693 ** -0.1111 **
0.1019 0.2300 0.0559 0.2080 0.0544 0.0730 0.0767 0.0170 0.0743 0.0850 0.0837 0.0430 0.0541 0.0400
Openness 0.0375 0.0605 *** 0.0502 *** 0.0394 ** 0.0379 ** 0.0388 ** 0.0503 ***
0.0271 0.1660 0.0137 0.0000 0.0134 0.0000 0.0154 0.0110 0.0151 0.0120 0.0160 0.0150 0.0175 0.0040
Deficit previous year 0.1584 * 0.0016 -0.0097 0.0005 0.0083 -0.0026 0.1968 *
0.0818 0.0530 0.0793 0.9840 0.0618 0.8750 0.0596 0.9930 0.0577 0.8860 0.0603 0.9660 0.1167 0.0920
Lack of civil liberties -0.9392 *** -0. 8082 *** -0.7473 ** -1.2792 *** -1.0602 *** -1.2193 *** -0.9900 **
0.2989 0.0020 0.3010 0.0070 0.3112 0.0160 0.3251 0.0000 0.2932 0.0000 0.3029 0.0000 0.3951 0.0120
























Number of observations 205 401 441 495 495 495 201
Countries 30 27 28 31 31 31 24
R2 within 0.268 0.392 0.350 0.220 0.250 0.222 0.428
R2 between 0.322 0.293 0.372 0.325 0.418 0.298 0.079







Tax revenue Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect
Const 13.8692 *** 4.2035 *** 8.0433 *** 18.0537 *** 4.7113 *** 12.3314 ***
1.6744 0.0000 1.1215 0.0000 0.9145 0.0000 2.5417 0.0000 1.3452 0.0000 1.4256 0.0000
Gdpvar per capita 0.0462 * 0.0071 0.0650 *** 0.0439 * 0.0066 0.0660 ***
0.0254 0.0680 0.0203 0.7250 0.0163 0.0000 0.0255 0.0840 0.0204 0.7460 0.0161 0.0000
Agriculture -0.2285 *** -0.1184 ** -0.1002 *** -0.2383 *** -0.1194 ** -0.1115 ***
0.0676 0.0010 0.0506 0.0190 0.0363 0.0060 0.0801 0.0030 0.0519 0.0210 0.0379 0.0030
Openness 0.0312 * 0.0196 0.0170 * 0.0373 ** 0.0213 * 0.0185 **
0.0168 0.0640 0.0119 0.1010 0.0089 0.0540 0.0182 0.0410 0.0122 0.0820 0.0091 0.0410
Deficit previous
year 0.0164 0 0630 ** -0  0009 0 0138 0 0610 ** -0  0002
0.0565 0.7720 0.0308 0.0410 0.0361 0.9810 0-0565 0.8070 0.0304 0.0450 0.0362 0.-9950
ANGLO 7.5976 *** 1.9240 * 6.2182 ***
1.7280 0.0000 1.1151 0.0840 1.4321 0.0000
Conflict 1 -4.0625 ** 0.3392 -4.9854 ***
2.0080 0.0430 1.0700 0.7510 1.3626 0.0000
Observations 495 440 440 495 440 440
Countries 31 30 30 31 30 30
R2 within 0.154 0.159 0.147 0.155 0.159 0.147
R2 between 0.579 0.227 0.536 0.279 0.110 0.370
R2 overall 0.522 0.187 0.517 0.348 0.119 0.400
Table III-2 (concluded)
14 15
Regressions 14-15 Conflict internal 2 Conflict 3 external
Tax revenue Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect
Const 17.8162 *** 4.8905 *** 11.4856 *** 17.2653 *** 5.1281 *** 11.0021 ***
2.5229 0.0000 1.3709 0.0000 1.4034 0.0000 2.3646 0.0000 1.2730 0.0000 1.2442 0.0000
Gdpvar per capita 0.0437 * 0.0066 0.0660 *** 0.0439 * 0.0069 0.0663 ***
0.0255 0.0860 0.0204 0.7450 0.0161 0.0000 0.0256 0.0860 0.0204 0.7350 0.0163 0.0000
Agriculture -0.2367 *** -0.1191 ** -0.1140 *** -0.2411 *** -0.1208 ** -0.1169 ***
0.0795 0.0030 0.0518 0.0210 0.0388 0.0030 0.0804 0.0030 0.0516 0.0190 0.0384 0.0020
Openness 0.0366 ** 0.0211 * 0.0179 ** 0.0382 ** 0.0210 * 0.0186 **
0.0183 0.0460 0.0123 0.0860 0.0091 0.0500 0.0179 0.0330 0.0120 0.0810 0.0089 0.0360
Deficit previous
year 0.0129 0.0612 ** -0.0002 0.0127 0.0613 ** -0.0004
0.0565 0.8190 0.0304 0.0440 0.0360 0.9950 0.0563 0.8220 0.0305 0.0440 0.0359 0.9900
Conflict 2 -5.1053 *** -0.1898 -3.8647 ***
1.6450 0.0020 0.8417 0.8220 1.3997 0.0060
Conflict 3 -4  3520 * -1  5568 ** -2  7287
2 5534 0 0880 0 7392 0 0350 2 2443 0 2240
Observations 495 440 440 495 440 440
Countries 31 30 30 31 30 30
R2 within 0 155 0 159 0 147 0 155 0 159 0 147
R2 between 0 304 0 108 0 219 0 257 0 148 0 156
R2 overall 0 293 0 118 0 235 0 207 0 132 0 194
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Note: The stars ***, **, * indicate, respectively, the statistical significance at the one, five and ten percent level. The first value below “re” is the 
coefficient value that indicates the slope of regression line, the value below the coefficient is the standard error, whereas the value below the star is the P 
value.
